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Mahul and Gurenko propose a financial model to address the design of efficient risk 
financing strategies against natural disasters at the country level.  It is simple enough to 
shed analytical light on some of the key issues but flexible and realistic enough to 
provide some quantitative guidance on the ex ante financing of catastrophic losses.  The 
risk financing problem is decomposed into two steps. First, the resource gap, defined as 
the difference between losses and available ex-post resources (e.g., post-disaster aid), is 
identified. It determines the losses to be financed by ex ante financial instruments 
(reserves, catastrophe insurance and contingent debt). Second, the cost-minimizing 
financial arrangements are derived from the marginal costs of the financial instruments.  
The model is solved through a series of graphical analyses that make this complex 
financial problem easier to apprehend. This model captures and explains the main 
impacts of financial parameters (e.g., insurance premium, cost of capital) on efficient risk 
financing structures.   
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The thesis underlying the Bank’s work on catastrophe risk management is that the 
reduction of vulnerability of the poor is an important part of development and poverty 
alleviation. “Reducing disaster vulnerability in developing countries may very well be the 
most critical challenge facing development in the new millennium…it is an issue of doing 
development right, and making sure that activities contribute to reducing disasters rather 
than exacerbating them.”
1  This argument of reducing the growing vulnerability of 
developing countries to natural disasters is indeed the best argument for ex-ante risk 
management at the country level.  Natural disasters generate disproportionately large 
human and economic losses.  In the absence of well functioning insurance markets, most 
of the economic loss from natural and man-made disasters is borne by governments and 
households.  Unfortunately, extremely low insurance penetration is a widely spread 
reality in the World Bank’s client countries, ranging between 0.3 to 1 percent, which to a 
large extent explains why the world’s poor suffer disproportionately from natural 
disasters. 
There is growing evidence that the frequency and severity of natural disasters is on the 
rise.  As a result of the increasing concentration of population in disaster prone metro 
areas, substandard construction practices and low insurance penetration, the fiscal and 
economic risk exposure of developing countries to catastrophic events looms large, and 
in the absence of active risk management, is becoming larger by the year.  For example, 
floods in Poland in 1998 caused a 3 percent loss in GDP, the Marmara 1999 earthquake 
in Turkey in 1999 generated a 5 percent loss in GDP, and Honduras faced a 20 percent 
loss in GDP following the hurricane Mitch in 1998.  
Although the low rate of insurance penetration in developing countries to a large extent 
can be attributed to their level of wealth, when it comes to catastrophe risk coverage this 
correlation between insurance penetration and the country’ GDP can be successfully 
defied as has been shown by the recent example of Turkey, which only in 3 years has 
managed to raise insurance penetration for residential catastrophe insurance coverage 
from 3 to 17 percent.  Historically, however, most governments have not taken much 
interest in hedging against disasters (until after the fact of a major event occurring) 
because of low perceived vulnerability levels and the fact that most severe natural 
hazards manifest themselves only infrequently.  In addition, there has been a willingness 
on the part of rich countries and other donors to provide post disaster funding for 
vulnerable countries subject to frequent catastrophic events.  The World Bank alone has 
provided more than $38 billion of post disaster funding over the last twenty years. The 
availability of free or inexpensive post-disaster funding discourages proactive ex ante risk 
management on the part of disaster prone countries, such as looking into market driven 
risk transfer solutions, including reinsurance. Indeed, given the cost of risk financing 
solutions offered by the private markets, it is rational for the developing countries to rely 
largely on free ex post aid and development banks’ post-emergency lending. Other 
reasons for the low insurance penetration rate are the underdeveloped state of domestic 
insurance markets, which lack the capital base, low underwriting expertise, a common 
mistrust in the formal insurance sector by consumers, and weak regulatory capacity. 
                                                           
1 James Wolfensohn, former President of the World Bank Group, 2003.   3
By ensuring that sufficient liquidity exists very soon after a disaster, modern funding 
approaches can help to speed recovery, ensure the scarce government funds are well used 
and reduce the risk-enhancing effects of moral hazard. In addition, catastrophe risk 
management can assist countries in the optimal allocation of risk in the economy, which 
may result in a higher economic growth, better mitigation and more effective poverty 
alleviation. 
The approach advocated in this paper is to develop risk funding solutions that would 
provide countries with strong economic incentives to engage in active risk management 
and thus overtime achieve significant reduction in their growing vulnerability and 
exposures. Such a major turnaround however would require linking, at least to some 
extent, donors’ post-disaster reconstruction grants and emergency loans from major 
development banks to progress achieved by countries in ex-ante catastrophe risk 
management.  This approach also rests on the notion of leveraging the Bank’s emergency 
funding with that of international reinsurance and capital markets. Only by combining the 
funding capacity of donor countries, development banks and global reinsurance and 
capital markets, would developing countries be in the position to adequately meet their 
demands for capital to fund the residual risk following major catastrophe events.  
This paper maintains that when it comes to funding natural disasters ex post financing is 
not the right approach. Instead it proposes a formal country risk financing framework that 
would provide tangible incentives for proactive country risk management and promote 
market risk financing.  A new generation of financial instruments that can address 
effectively these development issues is discussed.  Caballero (2003) investigates the 
desirable features of insurance and hedging instruments countries could use to efficiently 
manage exogenous shocks.  However, he notices that “even in the best managed 
emerging economies, aggregate risk management is being done with stone-aged 
instruments and methods” (p.37).  Freeman, Keen and Mani (2003) discuss risk 
management options in dealing with natural disasters and discuss the role of the 
governments and the international community in the management of catastrophic events. 
Gurenko and Lester (2004) outline an ex ante risk management framework for rapid 
onset disasters, including risk assessment, mitigation measures and the role of ex post and 
ex ante risk financing techniques.  They describe the range of ex ante risk financing 
strategies -including catastrophe insurance pools, reserve funds and contingent credit 
facilities- that can be used to finance the resource gap defined as the difference between 
potential losses and available ex post resources. 
Based on the country risk financing framework proposed by Gurenko and Lester (2004), 
this paper further investigates efficient combinations of ex ante instruments in the 
financing of natural disasters. It attempts to build a model that captures the main drivers 
of efficient risk financing arrangements. Using graphical analyses, it illustrates the 
tradeoffs involved in devising efficient risk financing structures.  It first identifies the 
resource gap in terms of frequency of occurrence.  It assumes that frequent loss events are 
self-retained by a country as long as they do not affect its long-term development 
projects, while very infrequent events are funded by ex post disaster relief programs from 
the international donors and/or debt forgiveness programs from the development banks. 
The remaining “in-between” risks define the resource gap to be funded by ex ante risk   4
financing instruments (i.e., insurance, contingent credit and reserves).  This gap is 
divided into multiple layers of risk. The marginal costs of the instruments (i.e., insurance 
premium, cost of internal and external capital) are then compared within each of these 
layers to determine efficient risk financing strategies.  Numerical examples illustrate the 
tradeoff between the financial instruments. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the vulnerability 
of developing countries to natural disasters.  Section 3 explains the main limitations of 
post-disaster funding.  Section 5 presents the conceptual model for the financing of 
catastrophic risks.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Vulnerability of Developing Countries to Natural Disasters 
There is a growing evidence that the coming years will see a rise in both the frequency 
and severity of natural disasters. The number of extreme weather events (e.g., floods, 
hurricanes, windstorms and droughts) increased from 20 during the 1950’s to 89 during 
the 1990’s (Munich Re 2001). The increased frequency of natural disasters coincides 
with the increasing concentration of population and assets in disaster prone metro areas 
which leads to growing economic losses. According to Munich Re’s estimates, in the 
1990’s, economic losses from extreme weather related events world-wide increased to 
US$630 billion from US$41 billion in the 1950’s (in 2000 prices). In 2003 alone, natural 
catastrophes claimed nearly 60,000 lives and caused about US$70 billion in economic 
losses (Swiss Re 2004). 
As a result of the increased concentration of the world’s population in vulnerable urban 
areas, substandard construction practices and low insurance penetration (see below), the 
fiscal and economic risk exposure of developing countries to catastrophic events looms 
large. As illustrated in Figure 1, average damages from large disasters faced by 
developing countries on average amount to 7.1% of GDP over the period 1977-2001, 
with a peak at 12.3% of GDP in 1987-1991. Such considerable risk exposures to natural 
disasters affect most small states, where these averages are much higher - 9% over 1997-
2001 and 34.7% over 1987-1991. 
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Source: World Bank 2003. 
At the country level, natural disasters can have numerous adverse social, developmental, 
economic and fiscal impacts. Among those are: the worsening the fiscal position, as the 
spending needs rise; the weakening of trade balance, as the country’s export capacity falls 
and reconstruction needs increase demand for imported goods and materials. This in turn 
is likely to put downward pressure on the exchange rate for local currency, reflecting 
both the weakening trade balance and reversal in private capital flows due to the shaken 
confidence of foreign investors, and give rise to inflation (Freeman, Keen and Mani 
2003).
2 
As a consequence of limited insurance coverage for catastrophic risks provided by the 
local market and the lack of risk awareness or economic incentives to engage in ex ante 
risk management, governments in developing countries generally rely on domestic 
budget, including diversion of resources from other projects, and on extensive financing 
from international donors to absorb the losses caused by natural disasters.  
Table 1 shows the gap between developed and developing countries in terms of insurance 
coverage for natural disasters. Only 5% of the US$22 billion losses caused by an 
earthquake were covered by insurance in Turkey in 1999, compared with 47% of losses 
insured in the case of Northridge quake in the US and 100% of losses insured in the case 
of winter storms in France. 
 
Table 1. Economic and insured losses from major natural disasters. 
Event (year)  Country  Economic losses  
(US$ billion) 
Insured losses  
(as a percent of 
economic losses) 
Earthquake (1999)  Izmit Turkey  22.0  5% 
Hurricane (1999)  Honduras  3.0  6% 
Floods (1997)  Poland  3.5  6% 
Earthquake (2001)  Gujarat/Bhuj, India  0.6  2% 
Earthquake (1992)  Northridge, USA  43.0  47% 
Winter storm (1999)  France  6.2  100% 
Sources: Gurenko (2004), Swiss Re (2002), IIASA (1999). 
 
The impact of natural disasters on the economic growth and the domestic budget is 
illustrated in Table 2. Although the US Northridge quake caused US$43 billion losses, its 
impact was almost negligible on the US economic growth (0.3%) and limited on the 
government revenues (2%). On the contrary, in countries where these infrequent shocks 
cannot be absorbed by the insurance industry and thus are borne by the country itself the 
                                                           
2 The above mentioned deterioration in the current account balance however can be somewhat offset by the 
inflow of foreign donor aid and payments by foreign reinsurers under reinsurance contracts with the local 
insurance market.     6
adverse economic and social impact of natural disasters can be simply devastating. 
Hurricane Mitch in Honduras in 1998, for instance, destroyed 34% of national GDP and 
was equivalent to 158% of total government annual revenue. Even for large national 
economies, the fiscal implications of natural disasters can be quite significant. The 
Gujarat earthquake, for instance, had a rather small impact on the overall Indian 
economy, around 1% of GDP, but the fiscal impact was considerably larger, amounting 
to 7% of government revenues. 
 
Table 2. Uninsured economic loss from some recent natural disasters 
   Loss 
Event (year)  Country  Percent of 
GDP 
Percent of government 
revenues 
Earthquake (1992)  Northridge, USA  0.3%  2% 
Earthquake (2001)  Gujarat/Bhuj, India  1%  7% 
Floods (1997)  Poland  3%  11% 
Earthquake (1999)  Armenia, Colombia  3%  23% 
Earthquake (1985)  Mexico City, Mexico  4%  26% 
Earthquake (1999)  Izmir, Turkey  5%  21% 
Floods (1998)  Bangladesh  17%  152% 
Earthquake (1986)  El Salvador, San Salvador  27%  180% 
Hurricane (1998)  Honduras  34%  158% 
Source: Gurenko (2004). 
 
Beyond the immediate adverse macroeconomic impacts of disasters, the indirect long-
term consequences of natural disasters may be even more severe. The fiscal impact of 
Gujarat/Bhuj quake forced the Indian government to increase its fiscal deficit by a few 
percentage for several subsequent years (Gurenko 2004). Hurricane Mitch in Honduras 
caused a stagnation of national GDP for several years despite the original pre-event 
projections of highly positive economic growth. Natural disasters are also likely to 
worsen the economic fundamentals of key industries in the affected developing countries. 
The increasing post event government borrowings to absorb the financial consequences 
of a disaster are likely to coincide with a decline in government tax revenues due to the 
fall in both GDP and export earning capacity of key industries which in turn may trigger 
downgrades of sovereign debt ratings due to the worsened public sector debt service 
ratios. 
Following major natural catastrophes, the ability of an affected country to have 
immediate access to ample liquidity has critical implications for the ultimate size of 
indirect economic losses generated by the destruction of physical assets. Prompt funding 
of post-loss projects is likely to speed the recovery of the economy and consequently,   7
would reduce the need to borrow in order to meet the fiscal shortfall.
3 The traditional ex 
post funding approach usually precludes funds from being disbursed promptly in the 
aftermath of a natural disaster. 
 
3.  Ex Post Funding Approach: What Is Wrong? 
Historically, most governments have not taken much interest in ex ante management of 
disasters because of low perceived vulnerability levels and the fact that most severe 
hazards manifest themselves very infrequently (Kaplow 1991, Kunreuther 1996). In 
addition to this cognitive failure, there has been a willingness on the part of the 
international community to provide post disaster funding for vulnerable countries 
exposed to catastrophic events. The World Bank alone has disbursed US$38.3 billion of 
emergency and reconstruction loans (ERL) over the last twenty years, as shown on Figure 
2. Almost 23 percent of these ERL were provided to Latin American and Caribbean 
countries and more than 18 percent to African countries. 
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The availability of free or inexpensive post-disaster donor funding discourages proactive 
ex ante risk management on the part of disaster prone countries, such as looking into 
market driven risk transfer solutions, including reinsurance. Indeed, given the cost of risk 
financing solutions offered by the private markets, it is rational for the developing 
countries to rely largely on inexpensive ex post aid and development banks’ post-
emergency lending. This poses a “Samaritan’s dilemma” (Coate 1995). 
As a consequence of underdeveloped domestic insurance markets and the lack of risk 
awareness or economic incentives to engage in ex ante risk management, governments 
generally adopt reactive response approaches to natural disasters, relying on domestic 
                                                           
3 Post-loss funding should not be used to replace lost assets, but to invest in post-loss projects that create 
the highest social and economic value (Clarke and Doherty 2004).    8
budgets, including diversion of resources from other projects, and on extensive financing 
from international donors. In fact, emergency funding for reconstruction from 
international donors has become a linchpin of some governments’ strategies for funding 
disaster reconstruction which is often supplemented by emergency reconstruction lending 
programs from the World Bank and other multilateral development banks. In addition, it 
is usually hard for the donor community to credibly enforce its pledge  to reduce its ex 
post assistance if ex ante mitigation measures have not been implemented because of the 
overriding humanitarian considerations once a disaster occurs. 
This does not mean however that ex post disaster funding from donors and international 
development banks cannot play an important role in the country’s risk management 
strategy, but that over-reliance on this approach has major limitations in terms of 
efficiency, effectiveness, and sufficiency. 
Ex post funding approaches are inefficient. The lack of advance planning and resource 
allocation prevents funds from being immediately available after a disaster. Multilateral 
assistance can take a long time to disburse. As a result, the adverse social and 
developmental impacts of disrupted economic activity are far greater due to the delayed 
response. 
Ex post funding approaches are ineffective. Resource allocation after a disaster may be ad 
hoc. Resources may be targeted on bureaucratic or political considerations, rather than 
directed to those expenditures and investments that are most likely to restore economic 
activity promptly. The diversion of limited fiscal resources away from development 
projects, creating high economic and social value added, to politically motivated low net 
return purposes, such as middle class housing, can have considerable opportunity costs 
and long term adverse economic effects. 
Ex post funding approaches are insufficient. Most developing countries face ongoing 
fiscal constraints. The quantity of funds available for relief and reconstruction may be far 
off from what is needed, even with additional borrowing and grants from the donor 
community. This leaves a substantial resource gap. 
A fundamentally consequence of natural disasters is that they tend to have the greatest 
impact on the poor, who are affected most by these adverse events. Scarce multilateral 
resources, which could have been utilized for growth and poverty reduction goals, are 
thus diverted by catastrophes, or more precisely, by the lack of appropriate ex ante 
disaster risk financing strategies. 
 
4.  A Formal Country Risk Financing Approach 
By ensuring that sufficient liquidity exists very soon after a disaster, modern funding 
approaches can help to speed recovery, ensure the scare government funds are well used 
and reduce the risk of moral hazard. In addition, catastrophe risk management can assist 
countries in the optimal allocation of risk in the economy, which may result in higher 
growth, better mitigation, and more effective poverty alleviation. 
The approach advocated in this paper is to develop risk funding solutions that would 
provide countries with strong incentives to engage in active risk management and thus   9
overtime achieve significant reduction in their growing vulnerability and risk exposures. 
Such a major turnaround however would require linking, at least to some extent, donors’ 
post-disaster reconstruction grants and emergency loans from major development banks 
to progress achieved by countries in ex-ante catastrophe risk management. This approach 
also rests on the notion of leveraging the Bank’s emergency funding with that of 
international reinsurance and capital markets. Only by combining the funding capacity of 
donor countries, development banks and global reinsurance and capital markets, would 
developing countries be in the position to adequately meet their demands for risk capital 
to fund economic losses inflicted by natural disasters. 
In the larger industrial countries, losses from natural disasters are typically funded 
through a combination of private risk financing arrangements and an efficient public 
revenue system relying on wide and deep taxation catchments (Lewis and Murdoch 1996, 
Priest 1996). In the case of developing countries, which have relatively low tax ratios and 
ongoing fiscal pressures, funding sources for post disaster reconstruction tend to be more 
varied, with a strong emphasis on assistance from international donors. Multilaterally 
sourced infrastructure loans and relief aid from donors agencies are among the most 
common sources of such disaster funding. 
A number of developing countries exposed to natural disasters has a limited capacity to 
absorb economic shocks caused by such disasters, thus relying on external sources of 
funding. Due to agency and information problems, new external capital is usually more 
expensive than internal capital (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993, Doherty 2000). These 
friction costs make the country risk averse to catastrophic events and thus make risk 
management strategies valuable.
4 The World Bank has been developing a country risk 
management model which is partly based on corporate risk management principles but 
also factors in key economic and social metrics such as government fiscal profiles, the 
living conditions of the poor, and investment in risk mitigation (Gurenko and Lester 
2003). This risk management approach at the country level relies on the assessment of the 
country fiscal exposure when all the cost-effective risk mitigation measures have been 
implemented, the identification of potential funding gaps between damages sustained by 
the country and funds available, and the financing of these gaps through private capital 
markets, and World Bank lending instruments. 
Risk assessment 
The analysis of hazard frequencies and intensities is critical to assess the country fiscal 
exposure to natural disasters. The methodology used by the catastrophe insurance 
modeling industry is based on probabilistic risk assessment models (Khater and Kuzak 
2002). Such models analyze the historical loss information. However, the quantification 
of catastrophe risk fundamentally differs from traditional risks such as automobile or fire. 
First, catastrophic events are, by nature, infrequent (for the insurer) and thus the historical 
data are limited or even unavailable. Second, the severity of catastrophic events is high 
because these large-scale phenomena, such as earthquakes or floods, impact a large 
number of households and properties at the same time. Historical data on these low 
frequency, high severity events are usually insufficient to estimate future losses 
                                                           
4 In a perfect market where external capital would not be more expensive than internal capital, i.e, in the 
absence of friction costs, risk management would be irrelevant.   10
accurately. In such cases, risk assessment models offer valuable scientific guidance by 
anticipating credible events that could occur in the future, but have not yet taken place. 
These probabilistic models have been recently developed to assess the risk of rapid onset 
natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, cyclones). Using a similar 
approach, the World Bank Insurance Practice is working on a drought risk assessment 
model. 
The methodology relies on simulation techniques and has the following four components: 
(i) hazard module, (ii) exposure module, (iii) vulnerability module and (iv) loss module. 
The hazard module defines occurrence parameters of the peril and the probability of 
occurrence of all events likely to cause damage to assets. The relevant parameters are 
selected from the analysis of historical data and scientific studies available. These 
parameters in the case of earthquakes are location, magnitude, and depth. In the case of 
drought, they include intensity (measured by an appropriate drought index involving 
precipitation, soil moisture, etc.), duration, starting date and spatial coverage. 
The exposure module defines the items at risk of loss and their average value of 
replacement. In the case of rapid onset natural disasters, items at risk are mainly stock 
items, while they are mainly flow items (e.g., agricultural crop yields) in the case of 
drought.  
The vulnerability module quantifies the damage caused to each item at risk by the 
intensity of a given event at a particular location. Vulnerability is measured in terms of 
the damage factor, which is the ratio of the repair cost to the replacement cost. This ratio 
is equal to one for flow items. 
The loss module estimates the losses by multiplying the damage ratio by the value at risk. 
This estimation is done for each item class at each location. 
The probabilistic risk assessment model, build upon the four modules, provides a set of 
risk metrics, i.e., quantitative measurements of the potential losses with respect to the 
frequency of the event, such as the average annual loss or the probable maximum loss 
(defined as the largest likely loss from a specific catastrophic event, for a given return 
period. 
Identifying the resource gap 
The level of risk retained by the country depends on its ability to absorb this shock 
without affecting its ability to invest in long-term economic development projects. The ex 
post sources of funding include redirected budget, tax increases, diverted loans (usually 
involving the development banks) and increased borrowing (Gurenko and Lester 2004). 
The size and the availability of the country’s fiscal resources can be typically 
approximated by the size of the fiscal surplus or the percentage of the fiscal budget that 
can be reallocated to address unexpected major events. The surplus of this fiscal capacity 
can then be used to determine the size of events in terms of probability of occurrence that 
can be self-financed by the government. Assume, for example, that a loss up to 8 percent 
of the current national budget, estimated at US$1 billion, can be absorbed without 
disrupting the fiscal and macroeconomic performance and that a US$80 million loss 
event has a return period of 10 years, then the government can retain losses from events   11
with a probability of occurrence higher than or equal to 10%. In Figure 2, this probability 
is denoted as  p  and corresponds to the amount loss L . 
In the event of major catastrophes, it is likely that international donors will come to the 
country’s rescue and will provide disaster relief, either directly or by forgiving and/or 
rescheduling the existing sovereign debt. Although the amount and the trigger of ex post 
funding are unknown, we assume that it is triggered for events with frequency lower than 
p  (e.g., 1 percent or one in a hundred year events) and that it covers all losses in excess 
of L .
5 
The resource gap is defined as a range of losses denoted as [ ] L L, , or equivalently a range 
of return periods denoted as [] p p, , which are funded neither by self-retention because 
these potential losses are beyond the financial capacity of the country, nor by the 
international community because they are too small to attract the attention of the 
international community. Consequently, this gap must be funded by ex ante risk 
financing arrangements, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
















The government pays for reconstruction using different domestic sources, such as 
reorienting the national budget, raising taxes, new domestic credit, and the accumulation 
of financial reserves (Caballero 2003). However, pursuing a post-disaster financing 
strategy may have high opportunity costs. Budget allocations may be diverted from 
priority development projects in order to face emergency and recovery needs. Raising 
new domestic debt in an expensive post-event capital market may significantly affect the 
country’s debt service, and raising taxes may discourage new private investments that are 
central to restart the economy. The government may not wish to retain all possible losses 
                                                           
5 The appropriate balance between ex post and ex ante funding mechanisms, based on the comparison of 
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given the cost of risk transfer, but rather those which are below a tolerable fiscal cost 
threshold. This threshold should be determined with a view to avoiding disruption in the 
projected fiscal and macroeconomic performance and should also take into account post 
funding sources provided by international donors.  Private risk transfer instruments can 
provide additional financial capacity to fund the resource gap. 
Financing of the resource gap 
The insurance and capital market offer several risk financing instruments to fund the 
resource gap. 
Domestic insurance market. In many developing countries, the domestic insurance 
market is thin.
6 Personal assets are uninsured because insurance is unavailable or 
expensive relative to the value of the asset, and insurers have limited access to 
reinsurance. In addition, recent studies of the market for catastrophic risk suggest that 
primary insurance companies, even in developed countries, retain large exposure to 
catastrophe events. Froot (2001) points out that insurers protect themselves from only a 
fraction of catastrophe losses through reinsurance, relying instead on self-retention. This 
degree of reinsurance protection is shown to be high for relatively small catastrophe 
losses (i.e., industry-wide insured losses from an event lower than US$1.5 billion), but 
low for moderate and large catastrophe events. For example, insurance companies would 
reinsure only 20% of a US$6.5 billion event, therefore retaining 80% of the losses. 
Several explanations for the paucity of catastrophic risk sharing have been proposed. 
Most of them focus on the supply side; insufficient reinsurance capital, reinsurers’ market 
power, high frictional costs of reinsurance, information asymmetries, and other market 
imperfections. On the demand side, this paucity is often explained by the presence of 
regulatory constraints, the existence of governmental funds for disaster assistance, or 
some behavioral factors that do not seem to be easily justified with an utility-based 
approach. 
Macro insurance. The transfer of catastrophic risk constitutes a key financial strategy in 
the economic management of disaster prone countries. The access to a new generation of 
macro insurance instruments to guard against the impact of natural disasters may enhance 
the risk financing strategy of developing countries (Caballero 2003). These macro 
insurance instruments should be contingent on observable variables that are independent 
of the country’s actions, avoiding moral hazard problems, such as weather indices (e.g., 
rainfall, temperature).
7   
Catastrophe bonds. Catastrophe (cat) bonds are an example of insurance-linked securities 
(ILSs) that transfer catastrophic risk to the capital markets via the issue of a bond where 
repayment of principal is contingent upon occurrence of a predefined catastrophe. The 
specified value limit of the cat bond is paid out when a pre-determined indemnity level, 
index or parametric trigger occurs. The parametric trigger based on scientifically 
measurable characteristics of a hazard (e.g., wind speed, earthquake intensity) is the most 
frequent because it protects investors from moral hazard and provides for quick 
                                                           
6 Non-life premiums per capita in 2002 are equal to US$ 7.7 in Africa and US$14.8 in South and East Asia, 
compared to US$1,711.2 in North America and US$678.2 in Western Europe (Swiss Re 2003). 
7 The problem of basis risk, due to the imperfect correlation between the index and the individual loss, is 
examined and quantified by Cummins, Lalonde and Phillips (2002, 2004).   13
payments. Introduced in the mid 1990’s, these ILSs mainly cover losses caused by wind 
and earthquake. Capital raised by issuing the bond is invested in safe securities such a 
Treasury bonds, which are held by a special-purpose vehicle (SPV).  This arrangement 
keeps the transaction off the balance sheet of the issuer and insulates investors from the 
counter-party credit risk.  The bond issuer holds a call option on the principal in the SPV 
with triggers spelled out in a bond contract.  Those can be expressed in terms of issuer’s 
losses from a pre-defined catastrophic event, by hazard characteristics, and/or its location.  
If the defined catastrophic event occurs, the bond-issuer can withdraw funds from the 
SVP to pay claims, and part or all of interest and principal payments are forgiven.  If the 
defined catastrophic event does not occur, the investors receive their principal plus 
interest equal to the risk-free rate (e.g., London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)), plus 
a risk spread usually between 300 to 500 basis point over LIBOR.  The average size of 
issue is around US$100 million, varying from US$10 million to almost US$600 million. 
The typical maturity of cat bonds is between one year and ten years, with an average 
maturity of 3 years. Issuers include insurance and reinsurance companies and, in some 
cases, insureds. These securities offer countries an alternative to macro insurance.  The 
cat bond market has developed slowly but steadily since it was launched in the 1990s as 
insurers have used the capital-market instruments as an alternative to using their own 
balance sheets to cover the potentially huge costs of a natural disaster, which could 
provoke massive insurance claims in a single area.  A total of almost $13 billion of cat 
bonds has been issued since the 1998s.  About $8 billion of cat bonds are outstanding, 
covering against natural disasters in the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, Taiwan and 
Australia and, more recently, Mexico. 
Contingent capital. Contingent capital is an alternative risk transfer (ART) product 
through which capital funding is provided to the client after the occurrence of some 
specific risk-related loss, often on pre-loss financing terms. It is designed to provide 
immediate and less expensive capital to the client when it is most needed (e.g., after an 
economic loss) and/or most scarce (e.g., after a regional disaster). Contingent capital 
facilities can be viewed as put options on paid-in capital. More specifically, this is 
essentially a commitment by a capital provider to provide paid-in capital on pre-agreed 
terms if the buyer of the facility exercises that right on or before the expiration of the 
contingent facility (Culp, 2002). Just like a regular option, contingent capital can be 
characterized by the risk of underlying asset, exercise style, and strike price. While this 
facility can potentially provide a country with a lower cost  capital relative to either a 
pure risk transfer solution (e.g., macro insurance) or accumulation of reserves, the major 
disadvantage is that once disbursed this facility could exacerbate the debt burden of the 
country. The effectiveness of this facility would thus depend on the country’s post-
disaster financial profile, and more specifically on its post-disaster ability to service debt. 
Forgivable debt. Contingent debt may not be an appropriate risk financing instrument for 
countries with high debt burdens. An alternative risk financing strategy would be to make 
repayment of existing sovereign debt conditional on the occurrence of pre-defined 
catastrophic events. Under this approach, sovereign debt used for financing development 
projects would be forgiven in the event of a catastrophe. Forgivable debt can be viewed 
as simple debt with an embedded put option written on the catastrophe loss which allows 
the borrower to “put” the loss of a disaster back to the lender who has written such an 
option. The lender in turn is likely to protect itself from such a loss through a risk transfer   14
contract to a third party. Forgiving the existing debt would enhance or restore the post-
loss funding capacity of a country. Such arrangements may also exist implicitly, when 
international financial institutions like the World Bank agree to forgive or to reschedule 
the existing sovereign debts following the occurrence of a disaster. However, the main 
advantage of explicit forgivable debt contracts is that they lay out in advance the terms 
and conditions under which the existing debt will be forgiven which greatly reduces the 
financial uncertainty in the aftermath of a disaster. Since this facility would alleviate the 
debt burden, the country may opt for a combination of forgivable debt and contingent 
debt to fund post disaster projects. 
 
5.  Designing an Optimal Ex Ante Catastrophe Risk Financing Strategy 
The design of an ex ante risk financing strategy is a complex issue relying on advances 
financial engineering techniques and sophisticated simulation software.  This section 
aims to discuss the key financial drivers in designing a financial strategy.  It is based on a 
model that is simple enough to shed analytical light on some of the key issues but flexible 
and realistic enough to provide some quantitative guidance on the financing of the 
resource gap.   
Three financial instruments are considered in this model: catastrophe insurance (or 
catastrophe bonds), reserves, contingent debt.  They represent the main options in the ex 
ante financing of the resource gap.  While catastrophe insurance is a risk transfer 
mechanism (to a third party), reserves and contingent debt are inter-temporal risk-
spreading mechanisms. 
Catastrophe insurance 
In an efficient catastrophe insurance market, where the return of shareholders equity 
approaches zero, the insurance premium can be decomposed as: 
Premium = expected loss + administrative load + catastrophe load. 
Consider the insurance layer covering losses from zero and the exhaustion point L.  The 
expected loss is  ( ) L l E ,
~
min  and the insurance premium net of the expected loss, i.e., the 
insurance cost, is assumed to be determined by 
(1)  ) ( ) ( ) ( L d L g L P + = , 
where  l
~
 is the positive random loss,  ) (L g  is the cost of capital and  ) (L d  is the 
operating costs (including underwriting costs and loss adjustment costs).  Equation (1) 
means that the cost of insurance is driven by the maximum possible loss L.  The 
catastrophe load  (.) g  is assumed to increase at an increasing rate as the attachment point 
increases.  This reflects the fact that the variability of this layer increases at an increasing 
rate and thus the risk capital needed (for a given insolvency level) increases at an 
increasing rate.  The operating cost function d(.) is assumed to increase at a decreasing 
rate as the attachment point L increases.  Consequently, the marginal cost of insurance, 
net of the expected loss, has a U-shape.   15
Under such assumptions, the cost of insurance of a risk layer [ ] 2 1,L L , with  2 1 L L < , is 
equal to  () () 1 2 L P L P − . 
Contingent credit facility 
Contingent debt is an alternative risk transfer (ART) product which enables the client to 
access capital after the occurrence of some specific contractually pre-defined loss, often 
on pre-loss financing terms.  It is designed to provide immediate and less expensive 
capital to the client when it is most needed (e.g., after an economic loss) and/or most 
scarce (e.g., after a regional disaster).  Contingent capital facilities can be viewed as call 
options on capital issued to the client.  More specifically, contingent capital is a 
commitment by a capital provider to provide the buyer of the facility with capital on pre-
agreed terms if he decides to exercise that right on or before the expiration of the 
contingent facility (Culp, 2002). 
We assume that the terms of the credit are  r l % interest rate, chargeable upon 
disbursement of the loan, with a maturity of m  years.  For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that the cash flow pattern of the credit facility follows that of a zero coupon 
bond.
8 A commitment fee of  % c l  charged on the committed loan is paid every year for 
maintaining the credit line in a stand-by status.  A front-end fee of  % f l  is charged on the 
disbursed amount of capital.  The expected present value of contingent debt, net of the 
expected loss of capital, for the layer of risk [ ] L , 0  is thus equal to 
(2)  () () [] L l E L l L l E
r
l
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where r  is the country’s discount rate (e.g., inflation rate), with  r l r < . 
One can easily show that the function h(.) is increasing with L, with 
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f , where  (.) F  is the cumulative distribution 
function of l
~
 and  L F f ∂ ∂ ≡ .  We assume that the commitment fee  % c l  is small 
enough compared to the front-end-fee and the interest rate so that 




















+ − = ′ ′ L f l
r
l




We assume that the country assesses the cost of contingent debt at its expected value. 
This means that the country acts as a risk-neutral agent.  This assumption is realistic if the 
country has a large tax base to spread its risk efficiently (Arrow and Lind, 1970). 
Reserve fund 
The country can borrow from itself and thus build financial reserves that can be used 
once a catastrophe occurs. The cost of reserves thus represents the discounted cost of 
                                                           
8 Zero coupon bonds are bonds that do not pay interest during the life of the bonds. When they mature, the 
investor will receive one lump sum equal to the initial investment plus interest that has accrued.   16
foregone investment in development expressed as expected rate of economic return on 
government investments in development projects  s l % (e.g., measured by the GDP 
growth rate) net of interest rate earned on low return by risk free government securities 











,  with  s ls ≥ . 
Optimization problem 
The objective of the Government is to design the least expensive ex ante risk financing 
strategy which covers all losses higher than L and lower than L . For the sake of 
simplicity, each layer of risk is financed by only one financial instrument, i.e., risk 
sharing arrangements are not allowed within each layer of risk.
9 
This problem is addressed by layering the resource gap [ ] L L,  into an infinite number of 
layers and then by selecting the least expensive financing instrument (i.e., reserves, 
reinsurance or contingent debt) within each layer. Consider the layer of risk [] ε + L L, , 
with  0 > ε  very small.  In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the expected cost of 







     for  reserves; 
  ε ε ) ( ) ( ) ( L P L P L P ′ ≅ − +     for  catastrophe  insurance; 
  ε ε ) ( ) ( ) ( L h L h L h ′ ≅ − +     for  contingent  debt. 
The cost-effective strategy for the layer [ ] ε + L L,  is thus the one which minimizes the 
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Efficient ex ante risk financing strategy 
Optimal ex ante risk financing strategies are analyzed by comparing the marginal of cost 
of risk of each financial instrument.  The proposed model offers a graphical interpretation 
to shed analytical light on some of the key financial drivers of the optimal risk financing 
strategy and to provide some quantitative guidance on the financing of the resource gap. 
Define  c′ as the minimum marginal insurance cost, i.e.,  [] ) ( min L P c
L
′ = ′ ,  c as the 
marginal cost of contingent debt with maximum loss L , i.e.,  ) (L h c ′ = , and c′ ′  such that 
the marginal cost of contingent debt is equal to the marginal cost of catastrophe 
insurance,  ) ( ) ( L P c L h ′ ′ ′ = ′ ′ = ′ ′ ′ .  
                                                           
9 See Gurenko and Mahul (2003) for optimal risk sharing arrangements within layers of risk.   17
We assume that L is large enough so that  c c > ′ . Otherwise, the contingent debt is not 
used as a risk financing instrument.  The model includes many financial parameters that 
will shape the optimal financial strategy.  In order to illustrate this model, we focus our 
discussion on the impact of a change in the marginal costs of reserve on the optimal 
financial strategy, with the cost of the other financial instrument being unchanged.  The 
key role of reserves is highlighted by Caballero (2003). 
Four cases are discussed and described in figures presented in the next pages. 
Case 1: High cost of reserves,  c S ′ ′ > .  
As illustrated in Figure 3, reserves are the least expensive financing instrument for the 
financing of losses [] 1 ,L L .  Insurance is the least expensive instrument for losses within 
the interval [] L L ′ ′ , 1 .  Contingent debt is the least expensive instrument for losses 
[] L L ′ ′ , 1 . Therefore, optimal risk financing strategy, as depicted in Figure 3b, consists of 
building reserves to cover losses between L and  1 L , buying a layer of catastrophe 
insurance to cover losses between  1 L  and L′ ′ , and purchasing contingent debt to finance 
losses between L′ ′  and L . 
Case 2:  Medium-high cost of reserves,  c S c ′ > > ′ ′ . 
As shown in Figure 4, an optimal risk financing arrangement requires to build reserves to 
cover losses between L and  1 L  and between  2 L  and  3 L , to buy a layer of catastrophe 
insurance between  1 L  and  2 L , and to buy contingent debt between  3 L  and L . 
Case 3:  Medium-low cost of reserves,  c S c > > ′ . 
As shown in Figure 5, catastrophe insurance becomes an expensive instrument compared 
to the other financial instruments, whatever the severity of the loss.  The Government 
should build reserves between L and  3 L , and buy contingent debt between  3 L  and L .  
Case 4:  Low cost of reserves,  S c > . 
An optimal risk financing arrangement involves building reserves only (see Figure 6). 
Reserves are thus used as the only ex ante instrument to finance exogenous shocks, as 
observed in many countries (Culp 2003).  However, in this particular case, this strategy is 
optimal because the marginal cost of internal capital is low.  This may be the case in a 
country with a high level of liquidity with limited investment opportunities. 
Risk-averse country 
The assumption of country’s risk-neutrality claimed by Arrow and Lind (1970) may not 
hold for most middle and low income countries exposed to natural disasters.  Their tax 
base is not large enough to spread catastrophic losses among the taxpayers and their high 
level of indebtedness may limit their capacity to borrow. 
The optimal risk financing strategy is re-examined under the assumption that the country 
exhibits risk aversion to natural diasaters.  The cost of inter-temporal risk transfer 
instruments like contingent credit is thus higher than the expected cost due to the   18
presence of a risk premium.
10  We assume that the risk premium  ) (L π  associated with 
the contingent credit facility providing full coverage for the layer of risk [] L , 0  increases 
at an increasing rate with L.  The expected present value of contingent debt, net of the 
expected loss of capital, for the layer of risk [ ] L , 0  becomes 
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We also assume the marginal cost of capital of the reserves increases with L. 
We illustrate the case where the country’s risk aversion is large enough so that h(L) 
increases at a decreasing rate for small L and increases at an increasing rate for large L.  
The optimal risk financing strategy is depicted in Figure 7.  The optimal strategy requires 
to build reserves to cover losses between L and  1 L , to buy contingent debt to finance 
loss between  1 L  and  2 L , and to buy catastrophe insurance between  2 L  and L . 
Numerical example 
This discussion is illustrated with a hypothetical numerical example to further highlight 
how the marginal costs of the financial instruments impact the efficient risk financing 
strategy. 
To keep this numerical example simple, the country is assumed to be risk neutral. 













The financial parameters of the contingent credit facility are:  % 0 . 5 = r l ,   10 = m  years, 
% 35 . 0 = c l ,  % 5 . 0 = f l  and  % 5 . 2 = r . 
The financial parameters of the reserve fund are  % 5 = s l  and s=2.5%. 
The catastrophic loss is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution, with parameters  1 = α  
and 2 = β .  This means that the expected loss is 2 (e.g., in tens of millions dollars) and 
its coefficient of variation is 200%. 
As shown on Figure 8, the optimal risk financing strategy consists of building 25 million 
reserves fund, purchasing catastrophe insurance for USD30 million in excess of USD25 
million and buying contingent debt of USD245 million in excess of USD55 million.   
It is noteworthy that an increase in the interest rate of the contingent credit would 
increase the demand for catastrophe insurance. For example, if the interest rate r increase 
by 100 basis points to 6%, then the Government should increase the insurance coverage 
by USD10 million, thus buying a USD47 million in excess of USD 25 million 
catastrophe insurance (see Figure 9). 
 
                                                           
10 As shown by Arrow (1965), this risk premium is proportional to the country’s degree of absolute risk 
aversion and the variance of the macro risk, as a first approximation.   19
 
6.  Conclusion 
Developing countries’ fiscal position and the vulnerability of the poor are being adversely 
affected by the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters.  This reality calls 
for more than the provision of humanitarian assistance.  It underpins the World Bank’s 
work on natural disaster funding which promulgates a country risk management model 
largely based on corporate risk management principles, but allowing for economic and 
social metrics such as government fiscal profiles, GDP growth and the living conditions 
of the poor.  This country risk management approach relies on three key requirements. 
•  Tangible incentives for active risk management.  Post-loss financing arrangement 
should reward the countries pursuing active catastrophe risk management with 
additional fiscal resources for rehabilitation of destroyed state-owned assets.  This 
additional financial assistance should be known in advance and be contingent on 
the country’s mitigation efforts. 
•  Rapid disbursement.  Despite the considerably shortened time frames required for 
the preparation of emergency reconstruction loans when compared to the Bank’s 
other lending operations, emergency loans are still relatively slow to disburse.  
Consequently, these lending instruments are inappropriate for meeting the 
government’s immediate and often significant liquidity needs in the aftermath of 
natural disasters which, if unsatisfied, can worsen the negative social and 
economic consequences. 
•  Promotion/development of private risk transfer markets.  The Bank has an 
important role to play by bringing together government and private reinsurance 
and capital markets and by facilitating the development of catastrophe insurance 
risk markets in its client countries. 
Countries need to develop appropriate ex ante risk financing strategies to supplement the 
traditional ex post sources of funding from government’s own budget and international 
donors.  This paper offers a country risk financing framework where the range of ex ante 
risk financing strategies is described.  A key issue is the design of cost-effective risk 
financing arrangements based on the risk profile and the costs of available risk financing 
instruments.  Using an original graphical analysis, this paper has examined cost-
minimizing risk-financing arrangements.  They are solved for every layer of risk through 
the comparison of the marginal cost functions of financial instruments.  This approach 
has enabled to capture the impact of financial parameters (such as insurance premium, 
cost of capital and contingent debt) on the efficient risk financing structure.   
The proposed model is simple enough to shed analytical light on some of the key issues 
to be addressed in the design of country risk financing strategies, but flexible and realistic 
enough to provide some quantitative guidance on the financing of the resource gap.  It 
highlights the complementarity of the risk financing instruments for different layers of 
risk, based on their marginal costs. 
   20
References 
Arrow, K.J. (1965). Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing. Helsinki: Yrjo Jahnsson 
Lectures. 
Arrow, K. and R. Lind (1970). Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment 
Decisions, American Economic Review 60(3), 364-378. 
Caballero, R. 2003. “The Future of the IMF and the World Bank,” American Economic 
Review 93(2), 31-38. 
Coate, S. 1995. “Altruism, the Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy,” 
American Economic Review 85, 46-57. 
Culp, C. 2002. “Contingent Capital and the Art of Corporate Finance,” in Alternative 
Risk Strategies, (Edited by M. Lane), Risk Book, pp.119-154. 
Doherty, N. 2000. Integrated Risk Management. (New York: McGraw Hill). 
Freeman, P., M. Keen and M. Mani. “Dealing with Increased Risk of Natural Disasters: 
Challenges and Options,” Washington DC: Working Paper of the International 
Monetary Fund, WP/03/197. 
Froot, K., D. Scharfstein and J. Stein. 1993. “Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate 
Investment and Financing Decisions,” Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1658. 
Gurenko, E.N. and R. Lester. 2004. “Rapid Onset National Disasters: The Role of 
Financing in effective Risk Management,” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 3278. 
Gurenko, E. and O. Mahul. 2003. “Combining Insurance Contingent Debt, and Self-
Retention in an Optimal Corporate Risk Financing Strategy,” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3167. 
Hofman, D. and O. Mahul. 2006. “Insuring Public Finances Against Natural Disasters – 
A Survey of Options and Recent Initiatives”, IMF Working Paper WP/06/199. 
Kaplow, L. 1991. “Incentives and Government Relief for Risk,” Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 4, 167-175. 
Khater, M. and D. Kuzak. 2002. “Natural Catastrophe Loss Modeling,” in Alternative 
Risk Strategies, (Edited by M. Lane), Risk Book, pp.271-299. 
Kunreuther, H. 1996. “Mitigating Disaster Losses Through Insurance,” Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty 12, 171-187. 
Lewis, C. and K.C. Murdoch. 1996. “The Role of Government Contracts in Discretionary 
Reinsurance Markets for Natural Disasters,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 63, 567-
597. 
Pollner, J.D. 2001. “Managing Catastrophic Disaster Risks Using Alternative Risk 
Financing and Pooled Insurance Structures,” World Bank Technical Paper No 495. 
Priest, G. 1996. “The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss,” 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 12, 219-237. 
World Bank. 2003. “World Bank Annual Report”. Washington DC.   21
Figure 3a. Marginal costs of risk financing instruments, with high cost of reserves 
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Figure 4a. Marginal costs of risk financing instruments, with medium-high cost of 















Figure 4b. Cost effective risk financing structure, with medium-high cost of reserves 





























1 L  








3 L  






1 L   L   L 3 L
c′ ′  
2 L  
c 
Marginal 
cost   23
Figure 5a. Marginal costs of risk financing instruments, with medium-low cost of 














Figure 5b. Cost effective risk financing structure, with medium-low cost of reserves 
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Figure 6a. Marginal costs of risk financing instruments, with low cost of reserves 















































L   L
Cost   25
































2 p  
Insurance 








1 L  












1 L   L   L 2 L  
Marginal 
cost 
Contingent debt   26
Figure 8.  Numerical example: cost effective risk financing strategy (interest rate of 















Figure 9.  Numerical example: cost effective risk financing strategy (interest rate of 
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